Introduction
The nexus between corporate ownership and the cost of debt has been investigated extensively from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Ownership and control frames agency conflicts, determines borrowing costs on debt markets and affects firm value. Earlier cross-country studies establish that a firm's ownership identity and its institutional environment matter with respect to borrowing costs. For example, government equity ownership of a publicly traded firm is associated with higher cost of debt due to state-induced distortions, but a lower cost of debt during financial crisis or when the firm otherwise faces financial distress (Borisova et al., 2015) . In the case of partial privatizations, the reduction in government ownership boosts the cost of debt, revealing the cost of reduced government guarantees (Borisova and Megginson, 2011) . While institutional ownership helps reduce the cost of debt through improved monitoring and governance, highly concentrated outside institutional ownership may use undue influence for its own benefit in ways that increase the cost of debt (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) . Finally, in environments with strong legal and market institutional settings, lenders are more willing to provide credit at favorable terms in private debt market (Qian and Strahan, 2007) .
This paper advances the discussion of the nexus of ownership and debt cost on two fronts.
First, we provide an empirical assessment of the Chinese bond market as to how corporate ownership structure affects the cost of debt in a political economy where heterogeneous firms face productivity and credit frictions. The endogeneity of home-country institutions constitutes a major empirical challenge for cross-country studies of corporate ownership and the cost of debt. We alleviate this concern by focusing solely on firms in China, where the state-owned sector of the world's largest emerging economy still dominates, but role of privately owned firms in the economic growth model has increased in recent decades. State and private firms in China differ in two important respects: productivity and access to external capital. State firms have lower productivity, but enjoy better access to external credit. Private firms enjoy higher productivity, but face financial challenges that force them to rely on retained earnings to finance operation and investment (Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011) . China's capital market has been greatly vitalized in recent decades through regulatory reforms such as privatization of state firms, the unlocking of restricted state-owned shares and improvements in market access for domestic and foreign institutional investors (Carpenter, Lu and Whitelaw, 2015) . 1 Second, we investigate how the market environment in which firms operate affects the identified dynamics of the nexus of ownership and debt cost. The extent to which a more sophisticated market environment, characterized by strong rule of law and vibrant market competition, imposes discipline on managers is well studied. We consider the less-explored issue of the market environment's net impact on lender evaluation of firms with heterogeneous ownership structures.
China provides an ideal natural laboratory for such as study as it offers heterogeneous market-supporting institutions across 31 provinces and different levels of state control across many industries.
This allows us to consider empirically how bond investors respond to government, institutional and foreign ownership, as well as the degree of response varies with issuers operating in markets with differing levels of sophistication. We focus on the corporate bond market because bond issuers are publicly traded companies, and thus required by the law to disclose their ownership structures and changes. Bonds also contain multi-dimensional contractual features such as rating score, call options and collateral requirements not found in the private loan market. Changes in these features help in study of bondholder reactions to ownership structure changes.
The impact of state ownership on the cost of debt depends on how lenders value the costs and benefits of state ownership with respect to a firm's credit risk (Borisova et al., 2015) . On one hand, having the state as residual claimer may provide an implicit guarantee to debtholders against default on repayment, especially in a crisis. This lowers the cost of debt (Borisova and Megginson, 2011) . On the other hand, government ownership is often associated with state-induced distortion and inefficiencies (Aharoni, 1986; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999; Toninelli, 2000) that can affect performance, and thereby increase the firm's cost of debt. Moreover, moral hazard issues associated with state ownership can reward managers to risky behavior (Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar, 2013) or encourage managers to pursue personal political objectives at the expense of debtholders. This increases the cost of debt. The net impact of government ownership on the cost of debt is thus also an empirical question.
The impact of institutional ownership on the cost of debt warrants deliberation. Recent literature suggests that firms that attract a larger number of institutional equity investors have narrower credit spreads and better credit ratings. This is likely due to the fact that institutional investors have stronger incentive and better skills with which to monitor management and develop corporate governance (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 2006) . The other channel for institutional ownership to reduce the cost of debt is through improved information environment of the firm. For example, active trading by institutional (including foreign) investors may expedite information revelation, thereby reducing information asymmetry between firm and lender (Wang and Zhang, 2009 ). However, the strength of institutional investor governance depends on the size of their equity holding and monitoring capabilities. This correlates with the firm's ownership structure (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) .
The market environment in which firms operate has a profound impact on their cost of debt. As Qian and Strahan (2007) show, in the presence of robust legal and market institutions, lenders are better positioned to force repayment or take control of a firm in the event of default, and therefore more willing to provide credit at favorable terms (lower spreads, longer maturities) ex ante. In this paper, we ask how the market environment affects the role of state and institutional ownership on the firm's cost of debt. A highly developed market environment can both discipline state-induced inefficiencies and reduce the value of the state's implicit guarantee. However, as theoretical prediction of which effect dominates is difficult, we consider the matter from an empirical standpoint. We expect the market environment to affect lender evaluations of the roles played by institutional investors. A high level of marketization helps discipline managers, thus reducing lender reliance on institutional monitoring.
We investigate these questions using a complete dataset that cover all the corporate bonds issued by listed firms since the launch of Chinese exchange bond market in 2007 to the end of 2015.
We then match bond data with ownership structure data and other characteristics of bond issuers.
To explore the role of marketization levels, we separate issuers into those headquartered regions with high levels of marketization (high-marketized) and low levels of marketization (low-marketized) based on the Chinese provincial level marketization index developed by Fan et al. (2011 Fan et al. ( , 2017 . We also separate those operating in highly competitive (high competition) and low competition environments based on the level of state-owned assets in their industries.
Our investigation shows that higher levels of state ownership are strongly associated with lower credit spreads. Ceteris paribus, the credit spreads of the bonds issued by state firms are 23.4% lower than those of private firms. This result is consistent with the productivity-credit frictions in a growth model of political economy. It suggests lenders consider the benefit of state implicit guarantee to outweigh the cost of state-induced inefficiencies. Further evidence shows the strength of state ownership matters. Issuers owned by the central government or with a larger governmentowned stake have even narrower credit spreads.
We find foreign and institutional ownership help in lowering the issuer's bond cost. Ceteris paribus, cross-listing in both domestic (A-share) and Hong Kong (H-share) markets translates into a 9.2% decrease in the bond cost. A 10% increase in institutional ownership reduces bond spreads by about 1.6%. Consistent with the institutional monitoring hypothesis, the impact of institutional and foreign ownership in lowering the bond spread is more pronounced for issuers with lower bond ratings, smaller issuance volumes and shorter maturities.
To test how the market environment affects the role of state ownership on the cost of debt, we assume that lenders consider the value of the market environment in disciplining state-induced inefficiencies to outweigh the cost of reduction in the state's implicit guarantee. If so, we should find the negative effect of state ownership on spreads to be more pronounced in environments with high levels of marketization. Three pieces of evidence support this hypothesis. First, the negative association between state ownership and spread is more pronounced for firms headquartered in highly marketized provinces. Second, the negative association between state ownership and spread is more pronounced for firms whose industries are less dominated by state assets. Third, treating the launch of the Communist Party of China's 2012 anti-corruption initiative (based on the Eight-Point Regulation adopted by the Politburo in December 2012) as an exogenous shock, we show the cost of debt for state firms fell significantly in the post-regulation period, especially in highly marketized regions. Taken together, our results suggest lenders consider the market environment as a factor in reducing the cost of debt of state firms more than that of private firms.
To see how market environment affects the role of institutional ownership, we partition our sample into issuers headquartered in high-or low-marketized provinces. We find the effect of institutional ownership in lowering spread is only significant for issuers headquartered in low-marketized provinces. The result is consistent with lenders considering the governance role of institutional investors to be important when the market environment for firms is weak.
This paper contributes to the literature on ownership structure and cost of debt. Prior work tends to focus on a single type of ownership structure such as ownership concentration, divergence between control and cash-flow rights, or identity of the controlling shareholder. For example, Aslan
and Kumar (2012) analyze theoretically and empirically the endogeneity of corporate control concentration and the cost of debt. Using cross-country data, Lin et al. (2011) document that the cost of debt is significantly higher for companies with a higher wedge of the largest ultimate owners' control rights and cash-flow rights created by potential tunneling and moral hazard issues. Using evidence from privatization, Borisova and Meggionson (2011) We focus on corporate bonds issued by listed firms operating in the exchange market for two reasons. First, while the interbank bond market is dominated by SOEs and unlisted firms, both Chinese listed companies also gain foreign owners through cross-listing in a foreign stock market. Since the 1990s, Hong Kong has become an important fund-raising platform for Chinese firms (Sun, Tong and Wu, 2013 options. Collateral equals one if the bond has collaterals at issuance or zero otherwise, with a sample mean of 0.40. Bond rating score is the numeric score of the bond rating at issuance, e.g. 6 for AAA+, 5 for AAA and so on. Issuer rating score is the numeric score of the issuer rating at issuance, e.g. 6
for AAA+, 5 for AAA and so on. Bond rating score ranges from 3.0 to 6.0 and Issuer rating score ranges from 1.0 to 6.0.
Bond issuer characteristics
At the bond-issuer level, we examine the ownership structure and consider an assortment of firm We also control for other firm-level traits. Firmage, the logarithm of the number of years since establishment, ranges from 0.69 to 3.47. Profitability, the ratio of net profit to total assets, ranges from -0.10 to 0.27. To measure firm risk, we apply a modified Altman's (1968) Zscore, sum of weighted working capital, retained earnings, EBIT and total sales. The variable Zscore ranges from -0.02 to 6.28, with a sample mean of 1.22 and a standard deviation of 0.71. CFrights, defined as the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the bond issuer, varies from 0.01 to 0.89.
Wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the bond issuer, with a sample mean of 0.18.
Regional and industrial traits
To measure the strength of market supporting institutions, we use the provincial-level marketization index and retrieve the information from the survey constructed by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI). Provincial-level municipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, are counted as provinces in this dataset (see Fan et al., 2011 and . The original marketization index, which ranges from zero to ten in our base year 2001, is constructed from official statistics and a selection of household and enterprise surveys. Fan et al. (2017) update the index in the base year 2008, so we merge the indices after adjusting the base year to get an index running from 1997 to 2015. This index is widely used as a meaningful measure of the progress of pro-market reforms in China. A higher value indicates greater progress towards a market economy (e.g. Lin et al, 2016) . We also consider the economic development of the bond-issuer provinces using the log of GDP.
In order to measure the state dominance in a particular industry, we use the ratio of total assets owned by SOEs over the total assets in the industry from 2007 to 2015. Based on this, we define the variable High_statedom as one if the value of state-dominance exceeds the median and zero otherwise. In this way, we are able to identify industries with high or low levels of government involvement.
4
Methodology, results and robustness tests
Methodology and baseline results
We examine the effect of ownership structure on the at-issue bond yield spread with the following baseline model, controlling for the firm-, bond-and region-specific measures defined above.
where bond characteristics include collateral, callable and bond rating score, as well as ownership traits such as state ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and whether the bond issuer is listed on multiple markets. Other firm characteristics include firm age, Zscore and profitability. Regional traits such as log of GDP are also considered.
Year dumm and ind dumm represent for year and industry fixed effects. As expected, the spread is negatively associated with bond rating score, firm age and profitability.
Collateral enters with a significant and positive sign because only riskier firms are required to provide collateral. Less riskier firms (e.g. firms with an implicit guarantee from the government) do not.
Next, we split our sample into groups based on the bond rating, issuance volume and maturity. Recent literature documents a link between institutional equity ownership and cost of debt through a corporate governance mechanism that could mitigate agency conflicts and reduce information asymmetry. Moreover, firms with low credit quality face stronger agency conflicts between debt-holders and equity-holders than companies with impeccable credit quality (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) . Hence, we expect that the effect of institutional holding would be stronger in firms with stronger agency conflicts and accordingly lower credit ratings. Similarly, we expect that the effect would be stronger for bonds with smaller issuance volumes and shorter maturities as their issuers are more likely to be of lower credit quality. (1) and (2) show the results with sub-samples of bonds issued by high-and low-rated firms with respect to the median bond rating score. The coefficients suggest that the effect of institutional ownership on at-issue bond yield spreads is only negative and significant for low-rated issuers, and not significant for high-rated issuers. This finding is consistent with our expectation. Additionally, HA enters with a large coefficient in the regression for low-rated issuer sample, indicating that listing on multiple markets affects the cost of bond financing in a larger economic magnitude for the firms with more severe agency conflicts. Columns (3) and (4) show the results for sub-samples of bonds with large and small issuance volumes. Columns (5) and (6) show the results with long-term and short-term maturities based on the median value. Again, the coefficients of institutional_holding_perc and HA are larger in column (4) (small issue) and column (6) (short-term bonds). This is consistent with our expectation that the effect of institutional ownership and cross-listing should be stronger for issuers with lower credit quality, where the need for institutional monitoring is stronger.
To further explore the role of institutional ownership on the cost of bond financing, we exploit a sub-sample that contains firms with multiple bonds and varying institutional ownership across time. 4 Focusing on these issuers allows us to isolate fully the effect of cross-firm differences that may bias our results. It also reduces our sample to 238 observations, however. We use a dummy
IH_increase equal to 1 if the issuer has higher institutional holding for the current issue that its previous issue of corporate bonds, and 0 otherwise. The change in bond-yield spreads is calculated as the difference of bond-yield spreads between the current issue and previous issue. The sample mean value of IH_increase is 0.126 with a standard deviation of 0.333. There are 30 bonds in our sample issued by the same firm with increased institutional ownership. The mean value of the bond spread change is -0.521%. There are 208 bonds issued by the same firm that have seen no change or a decline institutional ownership. The mean value of bond spread change is -0.105% (see Figure   2 ). (1) and (2) suggest that the effect of market development on the cost of bond financing is not significant on average. However, when we add the interaction terms into the regression, the coefficient of dummy SOE is no longer significant (although still negative) but the interaction term enters negatively and significantly, indicating that the effect of state ownership in reducing the cost of bond financing is more significant in provinces with more developed market-supporting institutions.
Columns (3) to (6) give results for central and local SOEs, as well as major and minor SOEs. Central SOEs, by definition, have a higher level of political connection and face softer external budget constraints than local SOEs. Therefore, the effect of central government ownership is stronger than that of local government ownership in reducing bond spread coefficients (-1.089 versus -1.016). Similarly, major SOEs have a higher ratio of state ownership, and thus lower cost of debt coefficients than minor SOEs ( -1.298 versus -0.792). The impact of stronger market institutions on heterogeneous SOEs is shown in columns (4) and (6). We find the effect of the local market environment in reducing the cost of debt is larger for central SOEs than local SOEs, and larger for major SOEs than minor SOEs. Taken together, our results suggest that lenders see environments with higher levels of marketization as favoring the state over private firms, especially those with high levels of state control.
Next, we compare the issuers in with higher and lower levels of state dominance. The results are given in Table 5 . First, we see that state dominance by industry increases bond spreads, i.e. lower competition raises the cost of bond financing. For example, in column (1) Taken together, the results of Tabled 4 and 5 are consistent with the interpretation that a higher level of marketization in the issuer's home province and industry helps to reduce the cost of debt for state firms more than private firms, particularly for state firms subject to higher government control or market exposure. This evidence suggests that lenders consider the benefits of the market environment in disciplining state-induced distortion or inefficiencies as outweighing the costs of any possible reduction in the state's implicit guarantee. In the following section, we propose a test to verify this proposition.
4.2.2
The 2012 anti-corruption reform (Griffin, Liu and Shu, 2017) .
It is important to note that the Eight-Point Regulation target executives of SOEs, but not executives of private firms. 6 To the extent that the Eight-Point Regulation reduces state-induced distortions, we expect lenders to grant lower credit spreads to state firms in the post-regulation period relative to private firms. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the Eight-Point Regulation affects the level of implicit state guarantee on SOEs. 
4.3
Institutional ownership and cost of bond financing (market environment impact) We show in China's political economy, state firms enjoy significantly lower bond costs than private firms, especially firms owned by the central government or firms with a significant state equity stake. This finding suggests that lenders consider the benefit of an implicit state guarantee as outweighing the costs of any state-induced inefficiencies. Consistent with the corporate governance role played by institutional investors, we find institutional and foreign ownership helps reduce the cost of debt for firms, especially those with lower credit quality.
We also present evidence on how the market environment affects the role of state and institutional ownership on firms' cost of debt. The effect of state ownership is more pronounced if the issuer is headquartered in a province with a higher level of marketization, operates in industries less dominant by state assets, or in the period following the Communist Party's anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012. Institutional ownership, in contrast, matters more in low-marketized environment.
This evidence suggests lenders consider more highly developed market environments as better at disciplining inefficiencies of state firms than private firms, and that the governance role of institutional ownership matters more for firms in low-marketized environments. Against the background of China's ongoing privatization and capital market reforms, our findings highlight the importance of both ownership structure and market environment, as well as their interactions, on the cost of debt for firms. Wedge difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of largest ultimate owner of firm
Regional and industry characteristics
High_statedom 1 if the value of state-dominance is above its median, 0 otherwise.
MarketIndx provincial level index measuring strength of market forces (institutions), from Fan et al. (2011 Fan et al. ( , 2017 . This table reports the results of the regressions examining the impact of regional market institutions on the association between state-ownership and the cost of bond financing. The dependent variable is the at-issue bond yield spread. We control for both bond characteristics and bond-issuer characteristics in the regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the results of the regressions examining the impact of government dominance in the affiliated industry of bond issuers on the association between state-ownership and the cost of bond financing. The dependent variable is the at-issue bond yield spread. We control for both bond characteristics and bond-issuer characteristics in the regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the results of the regressions examining the impact of the 2012 anti-corruption Reform (the Eight-Point Regulation announced in December 2012) on the association between state-ownership and the cost of bond financing. The dependent variable is the at-issue bond yield spread. We control for both bond characteristics and bond-issuer characteristics in the regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the results of the regressions examining the role of institutional ownership in reducing cost of bond financing in high marketized regions versus low marketized region. The dependent variable is the at-issue bond yield spread. We control for both bond characteristics and bond-issuer characteristics in the regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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